Linguistics and some aspects of its underlying dynamics

In recent years, central components of a new approach to linguistics, the Minimalist Program (MP) have come closer to physics. Features of the Minimalist Program, such as the unconstrained nature of recursive Merge, the operation of the Labeling Algorithm that only operates at the interface of Narrow Syntax with the Conceptual-Intentional and the Sensory-Motor interfaces, the difference between pronounced and un-pronounced copies of elements in a sentence and the build-up of the Fibonacci sequence in the syntactic derivation of sentence structures, are directly accessible to representation in terms of algebraic formalism. Although in our scheme linguistic structures are classical ones, we find that an interesting and productive isomorphism can be established between the MP structure, algebraic structures and many-body field theory opening new avenues of inquiry on the dynamics underlying some central aspects of linguistics.Comment: 17 page

Nec tecum nec sine te

Piattelli-Palmarini Massimo. Nec tecum nec sine te. In: Communications, 18, 1972. L'événement. pp. 128-131

Structure distale et sensation proximale

Piattelli-Palmarini Massimo. Structure distale et sensation proximale. In: Communications, 31, 1979. La nourriture. Pour une anthropologie bioculturelle de l'alimentation, sous la direction de Claude Fischler. pp. 171-188

Normal language in abnormal brains

There is little doubt that, in the adult, specific brain lesions cause specific language deficits. Yet, brain localizations of linguistic functions are made problematic by several reported cases of normal language in spite of major brain anomalies, mostly, but not exclusively, occurring early in life. The signal cases are hydrocephaly, spina bifida and hemispherectomy. These cases are discussed and possible solutions are suggested: namely a vast redundancy of neurons and/or the role of microtubules as neuron-internal processors and key factors in signaling and guiding the growth and reconfiguration of the brain. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.18 month embargo; published online: 28 February 2017This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

Minds with meanings (pace Fodor and Pylyshyn)

Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn have proposed a purely referential-causal semantics, a semantics without meanings. Adopting Pylyshyn's previous treatment of the fact that we can perceive and track something before we have any idea of what that is, these authors claim that such causal relations to external entities allow us to word-label them and thereby build an entire lexicon with specific referents. I disagree and explain why I do so. The kind of semantics that I prefer is radically opposite: the one proposed by Noam Chomsky and Paul Pietroski. This is an internalist semantics that only has meanings, reference being indirect, often indefinite, sometimes problematic. Chomsky insists that the only posit that is tenable is the internal structure of the speaker-hearer, a complex, abstractly characterizable, computational-derivational apparatus, optimal if left alone, that interfaces with other cognitive apparatuses: the articulatory-perceptual one and the conceptual-intentional one, satisfying the constraints that they impose. I show that the semantics proposed by Fodor and Pylyshyn is especially problematic when inexistent entities, possible entities, fictional characters and objects in the remote past are examined. It is, however, problematic even when dealing with more ordinary concepts. On the contrary, an internalist semantics avoids all these problems.Open access journalThis item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]